警告,因为你们中有些人很愚蠢,总是不停地向OG 寻求帮助。 1. 使用你的大脑,这已经发布了一年了……这很明显……
Just as we knew it would, Everything changed, as expected as soon as this article came out: DJI insisted drone-tracking AeroScope signals were encrypted — now it admits they aren’t https://www.theverge.com/2022/4/28/23046916/dji-aeroscope-signals-not-encrypted-drone-tracking
Godspeed and Good Luck to those of you who's lives depend on this. Please take heed to the words above, your live may depend on it.
Riding in a Jeep without doors will make you look at the brand in a whole new way!
Jeeps are quite popular vehicles with a devoted following. One of the reasons for this is that some models of Jeeps allow you to ride with the doors and roof off, which is a rather unique feature among vehicles. However, this may carry some safety risks. Read on to find out more about what riding in a roof-less, door-less Jeep entails.
A tool to disable DJI Aeroscope Remote ID broadcasts & simultaneously demonstrate vendor non-compliance in DJI Remote ID performance requirements. The name happens to be an anagram of "DJI AeroScope".
So, what happens when a vendor has fallen out of compliance with FAA performance remote ID requirements? How about when an end user accidentally, or on purpose shows that a vendors performance requirements are inadequate?
Is there a punishment, or consequence? Anything to worry about at all?
Flying a DJI branded drone with the Aeroscope branded Remote ID tracking still fully enabled can be like riding in a jeep with no doors, or poorly secured doors! It sure is lots of fun, but can be perhaps a bit risky at times. You may want to consider shutting those doors up securely before going on an excursion! At the very least make sure they are shut properly if you do leave the doors on!
Think of the doors on a jeep as being akin to a compliance mechanism for FAA. The FAA wants you to roll around with your doors completely off, or at a minimum unlocked, and open.
Privacy, "REMOTE ID DOES VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT".
There were all sorts of shocking things that happened behind the scenes with this rulemaking such as multiple secret meetings the FAA with outside parties which were intentionally kept out of the public eye and were never fully disclosed on the record.
The United States Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, Race Day Quads Oral Arguments Petitioner's Brief
Ultimate Guide to Remote Identification: Part 89, Lawsuits, Shocking Secrets, & More!
People have been privately taking advantage of the DUML commands to manipulate DJI AeroScope Remote ID status for a number of years. Commands have been openly discussed recently on the OG Mattermost server.
./comm_serialtalk.py /dev/ttyACM0 -a 2 -t 1000 -r 0300 -s 3 -i 218 -x 0500000000
The command above is fairly simple. The most complex part of it is understanding the privacy flag bits.
…Both ./comm_serialtalk.py and CIAJeepDoors.py should be run from the root of the OG DJI Firmware Tools repo.
As you can see from the CIA Jeep Doors python script the string of 0's in the comm_serialtalk.py command that has been privately circulating quite simply disables all the options in the broadcast, and disables it all together. There are in fact multiple options that can be applied to the AeroScope Remote ID broadcast, each enabling, or disabling some of the data that is shared.
The UAS Remote Identification Overview as presented by the FAA outlines the status quo for upcoming Remote ID laws for the United States, set to be enforced starting in September '22. It is important to understand how these rulings came to be, and to reiterate concerns brought up during the initial rulemaking. Additionally it is important to know what ramifications exist for violation of the rulings, if any. Specifically on the part of manufacturers that have performance requirement minimum standards to meet.
Several other countries have simultaneously created Remote ID requirements for UAS in parallel to the US rulings, this writeup will however specifically focus on US rullings. If you are interested in other implementations the European UAS standard is a great place to start, please take a look at: Introduction to the European UAS digital Remote ID Technical Standard.
During the initial rulemaking phases a number of concerns, and suggestions were put forth by the stakeholders tasked with advising the FAA on Remote ID. Many of those comments are extrapolated below, please make sure you read the surrounding context of each comment.
U.S. DOT FAA National Policy New Requirements for Registering and Marking Small Unmanned Aircraft
December 22, 2015
The FAA recognizes the potential value remote identification would have to public safety and the safety of the National Airspace System(NAS). Accordingly,the UAS-ID ARC will inform the FAA on available technologies for remote identification and tracking, shortfalls in available standards, and make recommendations for how remote identification may be implemented.
The UAS-ID ARC will consist of members from the attached list of aviation community and industry member organizations, manufacturers, researchers, and standards bodies who are involved in the promotion of UAS, the production of UAS, and security issues surrounding the operation of UAS. FAA and other Agency subject matter experts may be requested to participate and provide technical support to ARC members.
U.S. DOT FAA ARC UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee
May 04, 2017
The UAS-ID ARC will develop and submit to the FAA a recommendation report by September 30, 2017
September 30, 2017
The full UAS-ID ARC met on June 21-23, 2017, and July 18-19, 2017, for the purpose of education and information gathering. The full UAS-ID ARC met again on August 16-17, 2017, and September 7-8, 2017, for the purpose of discussions and deliberations.
The ARC recommends that, regardless of which option for applicability the FAA chooses, the following UAS be exempt from remote ID and tracking requirements: ... UAS that are exempted from ID and tracking requirements by the FAA (e.g., for the purposes of law enforcement, security or defense, or under an FAA waiver).
Apply the remote ID and tracking requirements to the remote pilot, not to the manufacturer of the UAS.
Require manufacturers to label their products to indicate whether they are capable of meeting applicable remote ID and tracking requirements. If a product is labeled as capable of meeting remote ID and tracking requirements, such capabilities must be enabled by default and the manufacturer must not present the user with an option to turn off the ID and tracking.
The ARC recommends a set of minimum data requirements for remote ID and tracking of UAS. (Sec 6.5, p. 39) The following types of data related to the UA or associated control station must be made available: ... Identifying information of the UAS owner and remote pilot: This information would not be broadcast or published, but would be available from the PII System ... Information available to designated public safety and airspace management officials: Access to personally identifiable (PII) information should be limited to public safety officials and similarly regulated public safety entities, including airspace management officials. ... Information available to the FAA and certain identified Federal, State, and local agencies: All relevant tracking data should be retained for a reasonable period of time to allow public safety officials and other authorized users to have access to information critical to investigations.
The ARC recommends that the United States government be the sole keeper of any PII collected or submitted in connection with new UAS ID and tracking requirements.
The ARC recommends that the remote ID and tracking system include reasonable accommodations to protect the operational security of certain governmental UAS operations, consistent with accommodations provided to governmental operations in the manned space
*Disclosure of Operationally Sensitive Information – Owner/operators may view negatively the loss of control of information associated with their flight operations. Even without disclos
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