Post-quantum cryptography audit — RSA/ECC/SHA-1 usages flagged by NIST migration guidance

Hi team,

With NIST finalizing post-quantum standards (FIPS 203/204/205) and the recommended migration deadline of 2030, I ran a quick scan of paramiko for quantum-vulnerable cryptography.

Findings (19 total):

File	Line	Algorithm	Risk
ecdsakey.py	14, 38, 61	ECC (SECP256K1/SECP256R1)	CRITICAL
kex_ecdh_nist.py	27, 49	ECC	CRITICAL
rsakey.py	43, 88, 134, 201, 256	RSA	CRITICAL
pkey.py	112	RSA	CRITICAL
_util.py	18	RSA	CRITICAL
_util.py	42, 67	SHA-1	HIGH
pkey.py	88	AES-128	MEDIUM

Why it matters: Shor's algorithm breaks RSA and ECC in polynomial time on a quantum computer. "Harvest now, decrypt later" attacks mean adversaries may already be storing SSH traffic to decrypt once quantum hardware arrives.

Suggested replacements (per NIST):

• RSA/ECC → CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA, FIPS 204) for signatures
• Key exchange → CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM, FIPS 203)
• SHA-1 → SHA-384 or SHA-512
• AES-128 → AES-256

I understand this is a large migration and depends on what the underlying SSH protocol itself standardizes (RFC 9142 / OpenSSH PQC work). Happy to help or provide more detail on any specific file.

Scanned with https://github.com/maddykws/QuantumMigrate