[Security] Authentication bypass: admin API endpoints lack session enforcement after /login

Severity: CRITICAL

Affected file: core/stats.py (login route: lines 51-57; unauthenticated endpoints: lines 59-125)

Description

/login (core/stats.py:51) checks the POST'ed id against trape.stats_key, but on success it only returns a JSON payload with the operator's private paths (home_path, remove_path, etc.) — it never creates a Flask session, sets a signed cookie, or issues any token. The client just stores the key in localStorage and redirects.

None of the following endpoints verify the caller afterwards:

• POST /get_data (stats.py:59) — returns all tracked victims (IP, geolocation, browser fingerprints, captured form values)
• POST /get_preview (stats.py:83) — returns full profile for any vId
• POST /get_requests (stats.py:99) — returns all intercepted form submissions
• POST /get_socialimpact (stats.py:105)
• POST /pn (stats.py:120) — renames any victim record
• the dynamically generated remove_path endpoint (stats.py:112) — deletes any victim's data

These are fixed (non-random) or leaked paths, so authentication is effectively cosmetic: the only "gate" is a one-time key check on a page that never propagates any credential to subsequent requests.

Reproduction

1. Locate a running trape instance (ngrok URL, local scan, or the home_path/remove_path values leaked by a successful /login response, victim-facing injectCode, Referer headers, etc.).
2. Without ever calling /login or knowing stats_key, send:
   bash复制

   curl -X POST http://target:port/get_data
   curl -X POST http://target:port/get_requests
   curl -X POST -d "vId=<any>&n=Spoofed" http://target:port/pn

3. All calls succeed and return/modify operator-only data.

Impact

Any network-reachable third party (not just the intended operator) can read all captured victim PII/credentials, or tamper with victim records, with zero knowledge of stats_key.

Suggested remediation

• On successful /login, establish a signed server-side session (flask.session) or issue a short-lived token.
• Add a decorator/before_request check on every admin endpoint (/get_data, /get_preview, /get_requests, /get_socialimpact, /pn, the remove path) that validates the session/token before executing any query.
• Do not rely on path obfuscation as an access-control mechanism.