Security: Command injection via unsanitized input in tcp_server.py and local_env.py

Bug Description

The TCP server (autoagent/tcp_server.py) and local environment runner (autoagent/environment/local_env.py) both construct shell commands by directly interpolating user-supplied strings into a shell command template, then executing with subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True).

Any input containing shell metacharacters (;, |, $(), backticks) will be interpreted by the shell, enabling arbitrary command execution.

Location

• autoagent/tcp_server.py:38-39
• autoagent/environment/local_env.py:76-77
• autoagent/environment/tcp_server.py:42-43

Reproduction

For tcp_server.py, a client connected to the TCP socket can send:

echo hello; id; cat /etc/passwd

This gets interpolated into:

/bin/bash -c 'source ... && conda activate autogpt && cd /workplace && echo hello; id; cat /etc/passwd'

The id and cat /etc/passwd commands execute on the host.

For local_env.py, any command passed to run_command() is similarly interpolated:

modified_command = f"/bin/bash -c 'source {self.conda_sh} && conda activate auto && cd {self.docker_workplace} && {command}'"

Impact

Remote Code Execution (RCE). An attacker who can send commands to the TCP server or trigger run_command() can execute arbitrary system commands with the process's privileges. This is especially critical because AutoAgent is designed to execute LLM-generated commands — a compromised or jailbroken LLM could exploit this to escape the intended execution boundary.

Suggested Fix

Use subprocess.run() with shell=False and pass arguments as a list:

# Instead of shell=True with string interpolation:
process = subprocess.Popen(
    ["/bin/bash", "-c", 
     f"source {conda_sh} && conda activate auto && cd {workplace} && exec \"$@\"",
     "--", command],
    stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, text=True
)

Or better yet, use shlex.quote() to escape the command:

import shlex
safe_command = shlex.quote(command)
modified_command = f"/bin/bash -c 'source {self.conda_sh} && conda activate auto && cd {self.docker_workplace} && {safe_command}'"

Found via codebase analysis. Happy to submit a PR if confirmed.