`fetchUrlContent` / `getUrlContextItems` fetch arbitrary URLs with no private-IP SSRF guard |

Static review of public source at commit 5522c6f44ca0. No traffic was sent to any Continue environment.

The built-in “Read URL” tool delegates to getUrlContextItems, which performs an unrestricted fetch:

core/context/providers/URLContextProvider.ts:

export async function getUrlContextItems(
  query: string,
  fetchFn: FetchFunction,
): Promise<ContextItem[]> {
  const url = new URL(query);
  const icon = await fetchFavicon(url);
  const resp = await fetchFn(url);
  // ...
}

core/tools/implementations/fetchUrlContent.ts only truncates length. Policy is allowedWithPermission, which helps for intentional calls, but there is still no allowlist / private-IP rejection before the host-side fetch runs. From an IDE/agent host that can reach RFC1918 or link-local addresses, a model-chosen URL (or open redirect) is classic SSRF-shaped egress.

Suggested change:

• Before fetchFn, resolve and reject private/special-purpose/metadata destinations (and re-check redirect targets if the fetch follows redirects).
• Optional allowedHosts / allowPrivateNetwork config for power users.
• Keep the existing permission prompt.

Severity: medium as missing SSRF egress control on an agent URL tool; mitigated somewhat by allowedWithPermission. No proof-of-concept.

Happy to send a focused PR if this direction is useful.